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OPINION  
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellants, former employees of Appellee Genova 
Products Inc. (“Genova”), challenge the District Court’s 
decision to dismiss their putative class action for medical 
monitoring as barred by the applicable two year statute of 
limitations.  While acknowledging that their exposure to the 
alleged toxic substances upon which they base their medical 
monitoring claims ended more than two years before 
commencing this litigation, Appellants contend that the 
limitations period should have been tolled by the discovery 
rule and should not have begun to run until they discovered 
the toxicity of the substances present in the Genova 
workplace, a discovery they claim was first made less than 
two years before this action was initiated.  The District Court 
concluded that the discovery rule did not save Appellants’ 
action because information concerning the dangers of the 
chemicals to which Appellants were exposed had been widely 
available for decades before they filed their complaint.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the dismissal of 
Appellants’ lawsuit.   
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I. 
 
 Genova manufactures vinyl pipes and rain gutters.  It 
operated a plant in Hazleton, Pennsylvania from 1975 to 
2012, employing as many as 240 workers in the late 1990s.  
Appellants are all former employees of the Genova Hazleton 
plant.  Appellant Louise Blanyar last worked at the Genova 
Hazleton plant in 2004.  Appellant Lawrence Buchman left 
Genova’s employ in 2006.  Appellant Edward Yachera 
terminated his employment with Genova in 1987.  The 
putative class action includes persons who last worked at the 
Genova Hazleton plant in 2009.  Genova ceased operations at 
its Hazleton facility in 2012, more than two years before 
Appellants commenced this litigation.   
 
 Appellants claim to have discovered previously 
unavailable Material Safety and Data Sheets (“MSDSs”) 
which reveal that, while working for Genova, they were 
exposed to carcinogens and other toxic chemicals linked to 
various diseases or conditions.  Appellants allege that the 
MSDSs show that the materials used in the manufacture of 
Genova’s products contained toxins subject to state and 
federal safety disclosure laws and other regulations.  
According to Appellants, Genova violated these laws and 
regulations, including the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) Hazard Communication Standard, 
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, by failing to inform them about the 
chemicals to which they were exposed and by failing to 
provide the requisite protective equipment.  While none of the 
members of the putative class have suffered an injury or 
illness linked to the substances used at Genova’s plant, 
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Appellants assert that they are entitled to medical monitoring 
because they are at increased risk of illness.1   
 
 Appellants’ complaint identifies sixteen specific 
chemicals associated with increased incidences of various 
cancers and diseases, including both Vinyl Chloride (“VC”), 
a gas, and Polyvinyl Chloride (“PVC”), a powder made from 
VC.  They state that PVC is “one of the most widely used 
plastic materials,” and that the health hazards of both 
substances are “well-studied and well-documented.”  (App. 
38 ¶ 22; 39 ¶ 28.)  Appellants note that the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency and the World Health 
Organization have classified VC as a known human 
carcinogen and that the Center for Disease Control recognizes 
it as a “significant potential threat to human health.”  (App. 
38 ¶ 25.)  Appellants also cite medical literature dating back 
to the 1980s that shows increased incidences of several types 
of cancer, respiratory illness, and reproductive conditions in 
                                              
 1 Though they have not suffered any injuries 
themselves, Appellants claim that, “[u]pon information and 
belief, a multitude of former Hazleton employees have 
developed chronic diseases or conditions as a result of their 
occupational exposure.”  (App. 40 ¶ 36.)  Appellants 
stipulated, however, that their proposed class definition 
excludes any former Hazleton employees who have 
manifested diseases or conditions believed to be attributable 
to their occupational exposure.  Appellants recognize that a 
medical monitoring claim may be “inapplicable to a situation 
where plaintiffs have already suffered compensable physical 
injuries.”  Slemmer v. McGlaughlin Spray Foam Insulation, 
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
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workers exposed to VC and PVC.  According to Appellants’ 
complaint, OSHA set strict standards for manufacturers who 
work with or around VC.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 (2017).  
These standards were first set in the 1970’s.  See 39 Fed. Reg. 
23,582 (June 27, 1974).   
 
 On May 15, 2015, more than two years after the 
Hazleton plant closed in 2012, Appellants brought this 
medical monitoring action in state court on behalf of 
themselves and all those similarly situated, including all 
cohabitating family members.2  Genova removed the action to 
                                              
 2 Under Pennsylvania law, a medical monitoring claim 
consists of the following elements:  
 
(1) exposure greater than normal background 
levels; (2) to a proven hazardous substance; (3) 
caused by the defendant's negligence; (4) as a 
proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a 
significantly increased risk of contracting a 
serious latent disease; (5) a monitoring 
procedure exists that makes the early detection 
of the disease possible; (6) the prescribed 
monitoring regime is different from that 
normally recommended in the absence of the 
exposure; and (7) the prescribed monitoring 
regime is reasonably necessary according to 
contemporary scientific principles.  
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the 
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federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act and on the 
basis of diversity jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The 
complaint alleges that Genova’s negligence resulted in 
Appellants’ occupational exposure to these toxins which has 
substantially increased their risk of developing serious 
diseases.  To detect and mitigate the long term health 
consequences of their exposure, Appellants propose several 
“well-established and specialized medical monitoring 
procedures.”  (App. 41 ¶ 42.)  According to Appellants, these 
procedures can allow for early diagnosis and treatment, and 
the management, mitigation, or even prevention of long term 
health consequences.  
 
 Genova moved to dismiss, arguing that Appellants’ 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.3  Appellants 
                                                                                                     
Army & Dep’t of Def. of the U.S., 696 A.2d 137, 145–46 (Pa. 
1997)). 
 3 Genova also argued that Appellants failed to plead 
their cause of action with the specificity required by Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  According to Genova, while 
the complaint does contain a long list of chemicals and 
potential monitoring regimes, it does not adequately plead the 
elements of a medical monitoring claim.  The District Court 
recognized the merits of this argument and advised 
Appellants to address these deficiencies should they file an 
amended complaint.  Appellants did not file an amended 
complaint.  Although Genova raises the argument again on 
appeal, we need not reach it as the statute of limitations has 
run on Appellants’ medical monitoring claim.  
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did not dispute the applicable two year statute of limitations 
for a medical monitoring claim, but contended that the statute 
should be tolled under the discovery rule as they were unable 
to reasonably discover their cause of action within the 
prescribed time period.4  The District Court granted Genova’s 
motion without prejudice, holding that the discovery rule did 
not apply because Appellants’ complaint attested to the 
prevalence of information regarding the dangers of PVC and 
VC years before this lawsuit was brought.  Blanyar v. Genova 
Prods., Inc., No. 15-cv-1303, 2016 WL 740941, at *7 (M.D. 
Pa. Feb. 25, 2016).  Thus, the two year statute of limitations 
for their medical monitoring claim had passed with respect to 
the named plaintiffs.  Appellants timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  Because the employees chose to stand on their original 
complaint, the District Court’s order is final and reviewable 
                                              
 4 Before the District Court, Appellants had also argued 
that the statute of limitations should be tolled under the 
doctrine of fraudulent concealment.  This doctrine “provides 
that the defendant may not invoke the statute of limitations, if 
through fraud or concealment, he causes the plaintiff to relax 
his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry into the 
facts.”  Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 860 (Pa. 2005).  The 
District Court concluded that Appellants had not exercised 
the reasonable diligence required for fraudulent concealment 
to apply.  Appellants have abandoned this argument on 
appeal.   
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.5  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 
950, 951–52 (3d Cir. 1976).  We exercise plenary review of a 
district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Fleisher v. 
Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  When 
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we “accept all factual 
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most 
                                              
 5  As discussed further below, Appellee argues that 
Appellants’ claims are barred by workers’ compensation 
exclusivity.  Although workers’ compensation exclusivity is a 
threshold jurisdictional concern in state court, LeFlar v. Gulf 
Creek Indus. Park No. 2, 515 A.2d 875, 879 (Pa. 1986), we 
join our sister circuits who have held that state substantive 
law cannot deprive a federal court of its diversity jurisdiction.  
See Goetzke v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d 766, 778–79 (7th Cir. 
2002); Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 975 (8th 
Cir. 1983); Dominion Nat. Bank v. Olsen, 771 F.2d 108, 116 
n.2 (6th Cir. 1985); Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 
1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1982); see also MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 
1086, 1109 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nygaard, J., concurring) (“It is 
axiomatic that, because federal subject matter jurisdiction can 
be conferred or withdrawn only by Congress, a federal court 
must look only to federal, not state, law to determine whether 
that jurisdiction exists, even when the substantive right at 
issue is a creature of state law.”).  Accordingly, we deem 
Appellee’s assertion of workers’ compensation exclusivity 
simply another potential ground for dismissal of Appellants’ 
complaint on the merits under Pennsylvania law—not as a 
threshold jurisdictional issue for a federal court sitting in 
diversity. 
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favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.”  Id. (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 
III. 
 
 Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a 
medical monitoring claim is two years.  Barnes v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 152 (3d Cir. 1998).  A medical 
monitoring claim accrues at the moment that an individual 
was “placed at a ‘significantly increased risk of contracting a 
serious latent disease.’”  Id. at 152 (quoting Redland Soccer 
Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army & Dep’t of Def. of the U.S., 
696 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. 1997)).  Because Genova’s Hazleton 
facility closed in 2012, no member of the putative class could 
have been exposed to any chemical as a result of Genova’s 
alleged negligence within two years of the filing of their 
complaint.  Appellants therefore argue that the statute was 
tolled because they were unable to discover the existence of 
their claim until they received the MSDSs.6   
                                              
 6 Appellants also contend that their claims are timely 
under the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act 
(“WCA”), which provides the exclusive remedy for claims of 
occupational disease.  77 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 481 (2017).  The 
WCA states that plaintiffs can only recover for occupational 
diseases that manifest “within three hundred weeks after the 
last date of employment.”  Id. § 411.  Recently, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that occupational diseases 
which first become manifest more than 300 weeks after a last 
exposure did not fall within the definition of injury in the 
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 The discovery rule “tolls the statute of limitations 
during the ‘plaintiff’s complete inability, due to facts and 
circumstances not within his control, to discover an injury 
despite the exercise of due diligence.’” Barnes, 161 F.3d at 
152 (quoting Kingston Coal Co. v. Felton Mining Co., 690 
A.2d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (emphasis added).  
“[T]he statute of limitations begins to run when the ‘plaintiff 
knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
known, (1) that he has been injured, and (2) that his injury has 
been caused by another's conduct.’”  Id. (quoting Bradley v. 
Ragheb, 633 A.2d 192, 194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  The 
application of the rule requires that the plaintiff use “all 
reasonable diligence to inform himself or herself properly of 
                                                                                                     
WCA, and thus were not barred by WCA exclusivity.  Tooey 
v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851, 859-64 (2013).   
 
 On appeal, Appellants argue that their claims are not 
time barred because Tooey created a previously unrecognized 
cause of action that, by definition, has a statute of limitations 
of at least 300 weeks after the last date of occupational 
exposure.  Appellee responds that Tooey has no application to 
medical monitoring claims and, therefore, that Appellants’ 
claim is not only time barred, but is barred by WCA 
exclusivity.  We need not address Tooey’s import on this 
case, however, as Appellants conceded before the District 
Court that their claims are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year 
statute of limitations, and Appellee did not raise WCA 
exclusivity in its motion to dismiss.  Thus, both parties’ 
arguments, raised for the first time on appeal, are waived.  
Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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the facts and circumstances upon which the right of recovery 
is based and to institute suit within the prescribed statutory 
period.”  Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 
548, 556 (3d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (citing Schaffer v. 
Larzelere, 189 A.2d 267, 269 (Pa. 1963)).  “Pennsylvania's 
formulation of the discovery rule reflects a narrow approach 
‘to determining accrual for limitations purposes’ and places a 
greater burden upon Pennsylvania plaintiffs vis-á-vis the 
discovery rule than most other jurisdictions.”  Gleason v. 
Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011) (quoting 
Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 364 (Pa. 2009).  
Ultimately, “the salient point giving rise to [the discovery 
rule’s] application is the inability of the injured, despite the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, to know that he is injured 
and by what cause.”  Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 
2005).     
 
 In a medical monitoring case such as this one, injury 
occurs when the plaintiff is “placed at a significantly 
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.” Barnes, 
161 F.3d at 152 (citation omitted).  Thus, for the discovery 
rule to apply, Appellants must not have known, and 
reasonably could not have discovered, the dangers of VC and 
PVC exposure prior to May 2013, or two years before the 
filing of their complaint.  As the District Court noted, 
Appellants’ own complaint recognizes the extent to which the 
substances they identify had been “well-studied and well-
documented in medical literature from around the world.”  
(App. 39 ¶ 28.)  Many of the studies cited in the complaint 
date back as early as the 1980s.  See, e.g., S.S. Heldas, S.L. 
Langård, & A. Anderson, Incidence of Cancer Among Vinyl 
Chloride and Polyvinyl Chloride Workers, 41 Brit. J. of Med. 
25 (1984).  The complaint also references OSHA’s VC 
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exposure regulations which have been in effect since 1974.  
See 39 Fed. Reg. 23,502, 23,589 (June 27, 1974) (now 
codified, as amended, at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017).   
 
In Barnes, we held that cigarette smokers’ medical 
monitoring claims were not saved by the discovery rule 
because “[e]ach plaintiff should have known that cigarettes 
put him or her at a significantly increased risk of contracting a 
serious latent disease years before [the] lawsuit was filed.”  
161 F.3d at 153.  In Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 999 
F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the court held that 
widespread knowledge of potential health hazards from 
exposure to thorium tailings years before plaintiffs brought 
their medical monitoring claim precluded application of the 
discovery rule.  
 
 As in those cases, Appellants knew, or in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence should have known, that they worked 
with and were being exposed to VC and PVC.  Considering 
the wide availability of information documenting the risks of 
exposure to these substances in medical literature, and VC’s 
regulation by the federal government dating back to the 
1970s, we agree with the District Court that Appellants were 
on inquiry notice well before May 2013 that their work at the 
Genova facility may have placed them at a significantly 
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.  
Appellants exercised no reasonable due diligence with regard 
to their claims, and the discovery rule therefore does not 
apply.  
  
 Appellants contend that the question of whether they 
were reasonably diligent in informing themselves of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding their claim should be left to 
Case: 16-1684     Document: 003112663899     Page: 13      Date Filed: 06/30/2017
14 
 
the jury.  While Appellants correctly note that reasonableness 
in this context is a question of fact, a court may decide the 
issue as a matter of law when “reasonable minds would not 
differ in finding that a party knew or should have known on 
the exercise of reasonable diligence of his injury and its 
cause.”  Fine, 870 A.2d at 858–59 (citing Pocono Int’l 
Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 
(Pa. 1983)).  Given the substantial evidence documenting the 
dangers of their occupational exposure to the substances used 
at the Genova plant, we agree with the District Court that 
reasonable minds would not differ in finding that the 
Appellants did not exercise the reasonable diligence required 
for the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations.  And 
because the statute of limitations for a medical monitoring 
claim has clearly run, the District Court properly dismissed 
Appellants’ complaint.7 
 
IV. 
 
                                              
 7 Because none of the Appellants have alleged that 
they have suffered any ill health effects due to their work at 
the Genova Hazleton plant, they may not be foreclosed from 
bringing personal injury actions if they later contract diseases 
related to their alleged occupational exposure.  See Tooey, 81 
A.3d at 865.  Although Appellants' instant claims for medical 
monitoring are time barred, their statute of limitations to 
bring personal injury actions would begin to run anew were 
Appellants to manifest symptoms of occupational disease 
three-hundred weeks after their last exposure to hazardous 
substances. 
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 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting Genova’s motion to dismiss.  
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